Han Feizi

韩非子 初见秦第一 臣闻：“不知而言，不智；知而不言，不忠。”为人臣不忠，当死；言而不当，亦当死。虽然，臣愿悉言所闻，唯大王裁其罪。 臣闻：天下阴燕阳魏，连荆固齐，收韩而成从，将西面以与强秦为难。臣窃笑之。世有三亡，而天下得之。其此之谓乎\!臣闻之曰：“以乱攻治者亡，以邪攻正者亡，以逆攻顺者亡。”今天下之府库不盈，□仓空虚，悉其士民，张军数十百万，其顿奸戴羽为将军，断死于前不至千人，皆以言死。白刃在前，斧□在后，而却走不能死也。非其士民不能死也，上不能故也。言赏则不与，言罚则不行，赏罚不信，故士民不死也。今秦出号令而行赏罚，有功无功相事也。出其父母怀衽之中，生未尝见寇耳。闻战，顿足徒裼，犯白刃，蹈炉炭，断死于前者皆是也。夫断死与断生者不同，而民为之者，是贵奋死也。夫一人奋死可以对十，十可以对百，百可以对千，千可以对万，万可以克天下矣。今秦地折长补短，方数千里，名师数十百万。

The subject states that while speaking without knowledge is foolish and knowing but remaining silent is disloyal—which should warrant death for a minister—he nonetheless begs to speak freely, asking the king to decide his punishment. He ridicules rivals trying to unite against Qin by pointing out three causes of ruin, then contrasts this with Qin's reality: though its people are untrained in war and would flee from white blades if rewards failed to materialize, Qin's current system ensures that when ordered, soldiers face death without hesitation because the king reliably promises both honor for success and punishment for failure.

For a reader today This passage offers insight into how consistent reward and punishment motivate military courage, and it highlights the speaker's willingness to risk his own life by speaking frankly to a powerful ruler.

English translation by Eastern Lens, from the revised daizhige Chinese classics corpus. The original Chinese is published alongside it for verification.

夫有术者之为人臣也，得效度数之言，上明主法，下困奸臣，以尊主安国者也。是以度数之言得效于前，则赏罚必用于后矣。人主诚明于圣人之术，而不苟于世欲之言，循名实而定是非，因参验而审言辞。是以左右近习之臣，知伪诈而不可以得安也，必曰：“我不去奸私之行，尽力竭智以事主，而乃以相与比周妄毁誉以求安，是犹负秆钧之重陷于不测之渊而求生也，必不几矣。”百官之吏亦知为奸利之不可以得安也，必曰：“我不以清廉方正奉法，乃以贪污之心枉法以到私利，是犹上高陵之颠隋峻裕之下而求生，必不几矣。”安危之道若此其明也，左右安能以虚言惑主，而百官安敢以贪渔下是以臣得陈其忠而不弊，下得守其职而不怨，此管仲之所以治齐，而商君之所以强秦也。

A skilled minister uses established methods and data to clarify the ruler's laws for the state and bind corrupt officials in service of the nation. Consequently, when these methods yield results, rewards and punishments must inevitably follow; if the ruler truly understands such wisdom while rejecting worldly desires, he can determine truth from falsehood by examining names against realities and verifying words through experience. Thus, those close to the ruler know that deceit offers no safety and admit that without honest effort and a mind free of corruption, they are like someone trying to survive after falling into an unbottomless abyss with heavy burdens; similarly, officials know that seeking profit through theft and bending the law for private gain is like attempting to live atop a high ridge on the edge of a sheer cliff. Therefore, those near the ruler cannot惑bthe sovereign with empty talk, nor dare corrupt officers to fish in the lower people's waters, allowing loyal subjects to serve without weariness and officials to fulfill their duties without resentment, which was how Guan Zhong governed Qi and Shang Yang strengthened Qin.

For a reader today This passage offers a framework for aligning administrative methods with clear outcomes, where verifying claims through evidence ensures accountability in government. It suggests that establishing transparent standards of conduct can naturally prevent corruption and maintain order within an organization.

English translation by Eastern Lens, from the revised daizhige Chinese classics corpus. The original Chinese is published alongside it for verification.

杨子过于宋东之逆旅。有妾二人，其恶者贵，美者贱。杨子问其故。逆旅之父答曰：“美者自美，吾不知其美也；恶者自恶，吾不知其恶也；”杨子谓弟子曰：“行贤而去自贤之心，焉往而不美。 卫人嫁其子而教之曰：“必私积聚。为人妇而出，常也；其成居，幸也。”其子因私积聚，其姑以为多私而出之。其子所以反者倍其所以嫁。其父不自罪于教子非也，而自知其益富。念人臣之处官者，皆是类也。 鲁丹三说中山之君而不受也，因散五十金事其左右。复见，未语，而君与之食。鲁丹出，而不反舍，遂去中山。其御曰：“反见，乃始善我。何故去之”鲁丹曰：“夫以人言善我，必以人言罪我。”未出境，而公子恶之曰：“为赵来间中山。”君因索而罪之。 田伯鼎好士而存其君，白公好士而乱荆。其好士则同，其所以为则异。公孙友自刖而尊百里，竖刁自宫而谄桓公。其自刑则同，其所以自刑之为则异。慧子曰：“狂者东走，逐者亦东走。其东走则同，其所以东走之为则异。

The traveler Yang passed through Song and stayed at an inn where the ugly concubines were honored and the beautiful ones despised; when asked why, the host replied he saw no inherent value in either appearance or flaw, prompting Yang to tell his disciples that acting virtuously while discarding pride leads to success. A Wei man instructed his bride-to-be to accumulate private wealth, warning that divorce is common while staying married is luck; after she hoarded for herself and was cast out by her mother-in-law, he grew richer without blaming his teaching, drawing a parallel to officials who should focus solely on duty rather than personal gain. Lu Dan repeatedly failed to persuade the ruler of Zhongshan until he left money for the ruler's attendants, causing him to be welcomed before speaking; upon being falsely accused by a prince after leaving the city, he realized relying on others' words invites betrayal and departed permanently. Tian Boding supported scholars to save his lord while Bai Gong used similar support to disrupt Jing state, demonstrating that identical actions toward scholars yield different outcomes depending on intent, just as Gongsun You mutilated himself to honor Baili while Shudiao castrated himself to flatter Duke Huan, and wild beasts chasing each other eastward may share direction but differ entirely in their underlying nature or purpose.

For a reader today This passage illustrates how identical outward behaviors—such as treating the beautiful poorly or acting kindly toward others—depend entirely on inner motives, while also warning that relying solely on human opinion creates vulnerability to false accusations and unintended consequences.

English translation by Eastern Lens, from the revised daizhige Chinese classics corpus. The original Chinese is published alongside it for verification.

一曰：宋之酤酒者有庄氏者，其酒常美。或使仆往酤庄氏之酒，其狗□人，使者不敢往，乃酤佗家之酒。问曰：“何为不酤庄氏之酒”对曰：“今日庄氏之酒酸。”故曰：不杀其狗则酒酸。桓公问管仲曰：“治国何患”对曰：“最苦社鼠。夫社，木而涂之，鼠因自托也。熏之则木焚，灌之则涂□，此所以若于社鼠也。今人君左右，出则为势重以收利于民，人则比周漫侮蔽恶以欺于君，不诛则乱法，诛之则人主危，据而有之，此亦社鼠也。”故人臣热柄擅禁，明为已者必利，不为已者必害，亦猛狗也。故左右为社鼠，用事者为猛狗，则术不行矣。 尧欲传天下于舜。鲧谏曰：不祥哉\!孰以天下而传之于匹夫乎"尧不听，举兵而诛杀鲧于羽山之郊。共工又谏曰：“孰以天下而传之于匹夫乎”尧不听，又举兵而诛共工于幽州之都。于是天下莫敢言无传天下于舜。仲尼闻之曰：“尧之知舜之贤，非其难者也。夫至乎诛谏者必传之舜，乃其难也。”一曰：“不以其所疑败其所察则难也。

The first account states that there was a wine merchant in Song named Zhuang whose wine was always excellent. Once I sent my servant to buy wine from him, but his dog bit the man who came; the messenger dared not proceed and bought wine from another household instead. When asked why Zhuang's wine was not purchased, he replied, "Today, Zhuang's wine is sour." Thus it is said: if one does not kill the dog, the wine becomes sour. Duke Huan asked Guan Zhong, "What troubles a state most?" He answered, "The greatest trouble is the shrine mouse. The shrine is wood coated with mud, and the mouse takes refuge there. If we fumigate it, the wood burns; if we pour water on it, the coating dissolves—this is why the mouse is likened to one in the shrine. Today, ministers around the ruler gain influence outside the court to exploit the people for profit, then collude inside to belittle and conceal evil while deceiving the sovereign. If they are not punished, law breaks down; if they are punished, the ruler becomes endangered—they hold power over us like a mouse in the shrine." Therefore, when a subject wields authority and holds exclusive control, those who act for themselves must benefit, while those who do not act for themselves must be harmed; these are also like fierce dogs. Thus, when ministers around become shrine mice and officials in power become fierce dogs, the Way cannot be implemented. Yao wished to transfer sovereignty to Shun. Gun remonstrated: "This is ominous! Who can hand over the world to a commoner?" Yao did not listen but raised troops and executed Gun on the slopes of Yushan. Gonggong similarly remonstrated: "Who can hand over the world to a commoner?" Yao again refused and led troops to execute Gonggong in the capital of Youzhou. Thus no one dared claim that sovereignty should not be transferred to Shun. Confucius heard this and said, "Yao's knowing Shun was worthy was not difficult. The difficulty lay in executing those who remonstrated before transferring sovereignty to Shun." Another account says: "If one fails what one observes because of what one doubts, that is difficult."

For a reader today This passage offers readers a collection of classical parables illustrating how political corruption and suppressed counsel undermine governance, alongside reflections on the difficulty of recognizing merit when fear silences dissent. It serves as a historical narrative drawing on Confucian thought about leadership, power dynamics, and the consequences of unchecked influence within court circles.

English translation by Eastern Lens, from the revised daizhige Chinese classics corpus. The original Chinese is published alongside it for verification.

乱主则不然，不知其臣之意行，而任之以国，故小之名卑地削，大之国亡身死，不明于用臣也。无数以度其臣者，必以其众人之口断之。众之所誉，从而悦之；众之所非，从而憎之。故为人臣者破家残□，内构党与、外接苍族以为誉，从阴约结以相固也，虚相与爵禄以相劝也。曰：“与我者将利之，不与我者将害之。”众贪其利，劫其威；“彼诚喜，则能利已；忌怒，则能害已。”众归而民留之，以誉盈于国，发闻于主。主不能理其情，因以为贤。彼又使谲诈之士，外假为诸候之宠使，假之以与马，信之以瑞节，镇之以辞令，资之以币帛，使诸候，淫说其主，微挟私而公议。所为使者，异国之主也；所为谈者，左右之人也。主说其言而辩其辞，以此人者天下之贤士也。内外之于左右，其讽一而语同。大者不难卑身尊位以下之，小者高爵重禄以利之。夫奸人之爵禄重而党与弥众，又有奸邪之意，则奸臣愈反而说之，曰：“古之所谓圣君明王者，非长幼世及以次序也。

When a ruler creates chaos, he does not understand his ministers' intentions and entrusts them with governance; thus small states are dishonored and shrunken while great ones fall and their rulers die from failing to use ministers correctly. Those who cannot judge ministers by measure must rely on the crowd's opinion to decide: they praise what the masses acclaim and hate what they condemn. Thus ministers ruin their families, create internal factions and seek external alliances for fame, secretly pact with one another and reward each other with empty titles and honors. They say: "Those who favor me will profit me, those who oppose me will harm me." The crowd, greedy for gain, is coerced by power: "If they truly like us, we gain; if they fear or anger us, we suffer." The populace gathers, and the people retain them; their praise fills the realm and reaches the ruler. The ruler cannot discern their true nature but thinks them virtuous. They then send deceitful men abroad as envoys of various lords, lending them horses to ride, trusted symbols, persuasive speeches, and gifts of silk and cloth; they make these envoys corrupt foreign rulers subtly under the guise of public opinion. Their actual mission is for other nations' leaders, while their talkers are mere courtiers. The ruler delights in their words and rhetoric, thus counting them among the world's wise men. Both inside and out regarding court officials, their satire follows one tone and shares one message. Neither small nor great finds it hard to humble themselves or offer high rank for reward; when奸人的 titles and pay are heavy, their faction grows larger, and with sinister intent they urge the treacherous minister further by saying: "What sages called a holy king or wise monarch was not achieved through seniority or succession."

For a reader today This text offers a warning to modern leaders about how crowds and self-serving officials can distort reality when unchecked. It reminds readers that relying on popularity over sound judgment often leads to disastrous consequences for governance and society.

English translation by Eastern Lens, from the revised daizhige Chinese classics corpus. The original Chinese is published alongside it for verification.